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Most observers agree that the muddling-through strategy of dealing with problem debtors is
at a crossroads. The debtor economies have suffered through reform and severe contraction, yet
their prospects are little improved. For their part, creditors have been unable to provide the new
lending needed to sustain investment and growth. Exposure has even been reduced slightly, but at
a cost of a steady deterioration in the quality of outstanding loans.
This has prompted calls by some observers for muddling-out: partially writing down creditor
claims to make way for business as usual. Their argument is that high debt levels act like a tax on
investment incentives. Partial forgiveness would provide more stimulus to growth and adjustment,
and to the return of capital flight, and therefore could increase debt service. To use Krugrnan's
(1987) terminology, the debt is so high that countries are on the wrong side of the "debt-relief
Laffer curve."' Few debts, however, have thus far been forgiven. One reason may be that it is not
in creditors' interest to give up their chance for full repayment. But it is hard to be sure because
the same free-rider problem that has crippled new lending will also block a coordinated write down.
A different group of observers has sought instead to fill the debt-reduction void through market-
based schemes, such as buybacks, buyouts, and exit bonds. This unlikely group includes advocates
of the debtors, who are frustrated by the free-rider problem and are attracted by the voluntary
nature of these schemes, creditors, who believe they would be better off under these schemes than
under a write down, and investment bankers, for whom a market made is a penny earned.
Yet these market-based schemes are not well understood. Important papers by Helpman
'Thieviewii originallydeecribedinSech.(1988a, b)
1(1987), Dooley (1988) and Krugman (1988) have clarified the analytics of some of the market-
based proposals. Nevertheless, general conclusions about the similarities and differences between
buybacks, buyouts, exit bonds and pure forgiveness have not yet emerged.2 The first part of this
paper, which is similar in spirit to Krugman (1988), seeks to compare systematically the equilibria
implied by these market-based schemes and pure debt relief (i.e., a coordinated write down by
creditors). We also compare the pricing of buy backs, buyouts, and exit bonds.
To summarize broadly, our findings in this part are that there is a great deal of similarity
between these market-based schemes and pure debt relief. The common rationale for these plans
is that investment may be powerfully stimulated through a reduction in the debt overhang. But
we also identify important differences across plans. The differences come from two sources. First,
the incentive effectsofdebt forgiveness, the distribution of welfare gains and losses, and the price
of old debt all depend critically on the source of the resources used for debt repurchase. Like
the homeowner who sells his windows to pay for the furnace, a country that relinquishes current
resources to achieve debt reduction may make itself (and possibly its creditors) worse off, and can
even reduce investment. Second, the agent making the take-it-or-leave-it offer differs across these
plans. The country basically chooses the amount of buyback or exit bonds it will offer (within
limits), and the creditors' collective chooses the amount of pure debt relief. This has an important
effect on the equilibria these plans imply.
Despite their differences, unilateral debt forgiveness and market-based debt relief schemes
rely heavily on one common feature: the negative impact of a large debt overhang on investment
incentives. How important is this "incentive constraint" likely to be in practice? Since 1982,
investment has fallen on average by over 5 percent of GNP, exactly equal to the increase in the
noninterest external surplus (which roughly measures the reduction in liquidity).3 In the meantime,
the debt itself has grown only slowly. Liquidity constraints, not incentive constraints, are probably
most responsible for the low levels of investment in the problem debtors. It would therefore be
surprising if debt reduction alone would be the optimal stimulus to investment.
The second part of this paper studies the role of liquidity in the design of anoptimalrelief plan.
'H.Ipnnn (1987)provides a vey general analysi. of debt/equity swap. and debt forliveneu. Dooley (1988) discuss, the
pricing of buybacb and simulates their welar. effect.. lCn.gmsn (1988) incorporates incertive effec and shows that rnarg,nai
buyb.cks and exit bond offerings at. equivalent to unilatal debt relid. See .1w wiui.,nson (1988), which analyses how
differences in preferences across creditan may strengthen the aumeM in favor of market-based debt reUef schemes.
'S the dlscusion in Dornbu,d, (1988), partiaslarly table 3.10.
2We find that countries that are severely liquidity constrained are the best candidates for a debt
reduction that will benefit all. That is, these countries are more likely to be on the wrong side of
the debt-relief LaKer curve. But they are also the countries that can benefit least from a write down
(since current resources are already so dear). We then show that by offering some current liquidity,
creditors can induce a greater investment response and yet forgive less. In liquidity-constrained
countries, pure debt relief ala 'will raise, but not maximize, the value of creditors' claims. Thus,
relative to pure debt relief, creditors' optimal arrangement will supply less forgiveness, but more
liquidity, and in doing so will also make the debtor better off.
Taken together, the two parts of the paper suggest that in many cases market-based debt
relief schemes are in noone'sinterest. Debtors stand to lose to the extent that debt relief depletes
currently available resources. In dealing with a liquidity-constrained debtor, creditors stand to
lose by providing too much forgiveness on any relief package that reduces the level of outstanding
debt without providing new lending. This is not to say that market-based schemes will never be
desirable from at least one agent's point of view. But in order to evaluate their benefits, proponents
will have to pay more attention to the source of debt-relief resources and to the severity of liquidity
constraints. Even if potent investment-incentive effects are present in LDCs, they are not enough
to make any manner of debt reduction best.
The paper is structured as follows. For readers who are unfamiliar with market-based debt
relief schemes, the first appendix contains a primer on how buybacks and exit bonds work. Section
I in the text presents a formal model which incorporates the investment incentive effects we wish
to study. The equilibria associated with several debt-relief schemes are then derived in section 2.
Section 3 considers the impact of liquidity relief on creditors' optimal choice of debt reduction.
Section 4 concludes.
1. A model with Investment Incentive effects
Several authors, most notably Sachs (1988a, b) and Krugman (1987, 1988), have argued that
the disincentive effects of an inherited debt may make partial forgiveness beneficial to both the
debtor and its creditors. In this section, we build a more formal model that can trace out the
incentive effects which are the critical element behind these debt relief schemes. The approach is
deliberately simple, but our basic conclusions are far more general.
3We consider a two-period model similar to that in Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1988). The
debtor country derives welfare from the discounted sum of the utility of consumption in periods 1
and 2:
(1)
where U1 satisfies the Inada conditions, and (4>0 and U 0. The world discount factor is 1,
and 8 c 1. We choose this special formulation for welfare in order to separate clearly the effects
of risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability. Welfare is linear in period-two consumption in
order to abstract from the risk-sharing issues considered by Helpman (1987). Naturally, these issues
are important, but they complicate the algebra without adding to the intuitions below.4 A major
disadvantage of linear welfare, however, is that it implies an infinite elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. By allowing for concavity in period-one utility, we can explore the implications of
finite intertemporal substitutability without forcing preferences to be risk-averse.
The country enters the model with an endowment E, and an inherited debt, D. In period
zero, the country announces its plans for a buyback. In period one, there is a competitive auction
among creditors in which they exchange old debt for the new securities. Also in period one the
country chooses a level of investment, I, which yields period-two output of=1(l)+c, where
falsosatisfies the Inada conditions, f'>0, f"c0, and E is a random variable with support
[j.5 In period two, the country must make a payment on its outstanding obligations, D —
wherer is the amount of old debt retired less any .securitiesissued, that is, x is the amount
of effective debt relief. The investment incentives we wish to study are sharpest if we make the
'1gunboat technology" assumption that the entire output, ,canbe confiscated by creditors in the
event of default.6 Period-two payments are then:
R=min(D—r,). (2)
Under these assumptions, the country chooses investment to maximize its objective function,
taking x as given:
= max U1(E —I)+,SE(max(O,u— D ÷ x)), (3)
flnd.ed,some ol the proposition,belowgo through with trivial modification for concave period-two subutilily.
1f the pnc. ol output ii uncertaIn, then the randomness would enter multiplicativaly, tithe thin add.itiv.iy. The analyu.
below goes through in either east.
'Qualitatively, our analysi, relies on the anumption that the country sacrifice. an amount that incrazes with the value ol
output 'when dejeinJt occun The result. would also hold if we were to assum. that creditor, cannot actually confiscate output,
but can impoe. penaltie, on the debt in proportion to the value of output.
4where E is the expectations operator.7 The last term in equation (3) follows directly from the
repayment assumption in (2). In good states, the country pays off its debt and gets to consume
whatever is left. In all other states, the country cannot fully meet its debt service requirements, so
that the investment project's output is confiscated.
The country's first-order condition for investment is given by:
f'(I•) = , (4)
where C = G(1, x) = ft'. g(c)dE is the probability that the country will reap some surplus from the
project, and c = D —z — f(I)defines the level of output that exactly pays off the outstanding
obligations. In some states a marginal increase in output is confiscated, which is adisincentive to
invest. The factor i/G >1measures the investment distortion, the extent to which the marginal
product of investment is greater than at the country's first-best level.
Equation (4) defines implicitly the optimal level of investment as an increasingfunction of
z,I'= f(x).8 As the overall debt payment is reduced, additional investment raises period-two
consumption in more states of the world. The debtor perceives this as a higher return on investment,
and it therefore invests more.
2. A menu of debt-relief schemes
Where do the initial resources needed to generate the effective relief, x, come from? We
consider four sources: 1) partial forgiveness from creditors, 2) aid from foreign governments, 3)
output from the debtor's investment project, and 4) the debtor'sendowment.
2.1. Pure debt relief
Suppose that creditors agree to write down their collective claims onthe country, an action
we call pure debt relief. We take their choice of zasexogenous, and assume that the debtor sets
investment optimally (I = I'(x)). We return to how r is determined under pure debtrelief after
discussing the following Proposition:
Tweassume the endowment El. small enough so that the country would be a borrowe atthe world interest rate if it were
not credit rationed.Thisassumption is critical for the incentive effects to have an impact on investment.Seethe discussion in
section 2-4 and footnote 25 below.
We assume that f(1) is sufficiently concave so that this statement is true. Applying the implicit functiontheorem to (4),
and using (3) yields
d1 — >0 dx —
where the denominator is the second-order condition for the problem in (3).
5Proposition 1. Under pure debt relief, the welfare of the debtor, the welfare of creditors
(taken together), and the price of a dollar's worth of the remaining debt, can be completely described
by the amount of effective debt relief, x:
(1) Debtor welfare is given by
W(x)=U1(E —1(x))+ U3(I'(x),x), (5)
where U2(I(r), r) = E(max(O, f(JC) + c —D+ z))and ¶> 0;
(ii) Creditors' collective welfare is the market value of their claims:
V(x) = E(min(f(t'(x)) + r, D —x)), (6)
where
dv' ,dJ' dv' =(1-
—G,E [-ij. (7) dx dx dx
(iii)The price of a marginal unit of debt after the debt relief takes effect, given by ,isthe
average market value of the debt:
1V'(x) 8
9(x) D
Part (1) of the proposition shows that debtor welfare is an increasing function of the amount
forgiven: pure debt relief always makes debtors better off. Part (ii) shows that creditors are better
off only when an increase in forgiveness increases expected payments, that is, when >
(Noticethat we have assumed that creditors are risk neutral and that they know the optimal
investment schedule of the country.) V' is increasing when (7) is dominated by the first term,
which represents the increase in expected payments due to a higher level of investment. The
second term in (7), which is negative, measures the loss in states with full repayment as the face
value of the debt is reduced. When the probability of full repayment is small, (7) is positive.
Creditors gain from a reduction in contracted payments, with the size of the gain proportional to
the impact on investment of the change in incentives. On the other hand, when the probability of
complete repayment is high, (7) is negative. V(x) is therefore hump-shaped, as drawn in figure
Thedebt Sell. at . däcountin thesecondary mrk.t— Long a.th. probability offull npaym.nt I. l.a.thanone, C C1.
In the neighborhood of fr. 0, 0 ii necessarily leg, than one.
61. This, of course, is Krugman's (1987) debt-relief Laffer curve. The value of creditors' claims is
maximized at the top of the curve, where= 0. Pure debt relief is in the interest of boththe
debtor and its creditors when the country is on the wrong side of the Laffer curve.
As Long as the country is on the right side of the Lafer curve, pure debt relief is not in creditors'
collective interest. But, even worse, it is never in an individual's interest. A given creditor's claims
can have only a small impa on V.. Thus, conditional on other creditors ripping up their claims,
an individual creditor would prefer to hold on to his. Pure debt relief will therefore be hindered
by the free rider problem. Even a country on the wrong side of the Laffer curve should not expect
individual creditors of their own volition to set x such that = 0.
The difficulty of getting creditors to act as a collective entity has spawned the market-based
proposals we consider next. There are two important features that distinguish the equilibria en-
visaged in these proposals from that in pure debt relief. First, the country, and not the creditors'
collective, acts by making a take-it-or-leave it buyback offer. Second, individual creditors must
voluntarily participate in a market-based scheme. To be successful such schemes must therefore
circumvent the free rider problem.
2.2. Buybacks out of aid from foreign governments
Suppose that resources for buying back debt are donated specifically for that purpose by an-
other country!° In period zero, the country informs creditors that in period one it will auction
off these resources in return for old debt. We assume that the debtor and its creditors rationally
anticipate the optimal period-one investment response, I =P(z),and that the auction is compet-
itive. Let b represent the donated funds, given exogenously, and let x =z(b)=96(6)bdenote the
face amount of old debt repurchased in the auction, i.e., the effective amount of relief generated by
the buyback. The buyback equilibrium is summarized iii the following proposition (and proven in
the second appendix):
PropositIon 2. When resources for a competitive buyback are donated, the equilibrium is
'°Acountry'sabilityto buy back debt on the secondary market isa matter of some controveray, although Bolivia recently
completed a buyback in which about 1/2 of it. debt was retir.d. Syndication agreements in commercial bank toans make
boybacks probtanatic. The.. agreements contain a mandatory prepayment cla.sse, which stipulate, that any prepayment must
be distnbuted among creditors accordingtoexpo.ure, sad a •hszing claus. which requirn that .a,y payment received by a
creditor in excess of its expoeure must be shared among all bsah according to exposure. See the discussion In settion 2.5
below.
7characterized by:'1
(i) Debtor welfare is the same as under pure debt relief:
w(x) = (9)
andisstrictlyincreasingin amount of effective relief, > 0.
(ii) Creditors'collectivewelfare is greater than under pure debt relief by the amount of aid:
Vb(x,b) =V'(r)+b, (10)
whichis increasing in the amount of the buyback, ç ￿
(iii) The buyback takes place at a price where a marginal unit of debt after the buyback, !t,
is equal to the average market value of the debt remaining:
1 V'(z)
(11) 96(x) D—r
Theeffective amount of relief is strictly increasing in 6:= > 0.
Notice the similarity between parts (i) and (ii) of propositions 1 and 2. Buybacks funded
by a third party reduce future debt payments, and therefore have an effect on future payments
equivalent to that of pure debt relief. Up to the value of the transfer, 6, buybacksoutof aid are
equivalenttopure debt relief,forany given level of effective relief. It is as if the aid is given directly
to creditors in return for a write down of size x. The auction merely serves to translate a fixed
amount of buybaclc resources, 6, into effective debt relief, z. The larger the transfer, the more
creditors gain. From an efficiency point of view, nothing is different from proposition 1: once the
transfer is netted out, Pareto improvements are possible only if the country is on the wrong side
of the debt-relief Laffer curve. Figure 1 graphs expected creditor payments under pure debt relief
and a buyback out of aid, V and Vb, respectively. While V is hump-shaped, V6 is concave and
increasing everywhere, which reflects the added value of the transfer, 6.
Part (iii) of the proposition says that the buyback price is the inverse of the expected value
of the last unit of old debt repurchased. If the auction is competitive, the price, ji, must be such
tisom.ofthat rault. at. di.cuaaiby Dooky (1988).
8that individual creditors are indifferent between holding onto their old debt, and trading in their
old debt for cash. Thus in equilibrium, the expected payoff from holding 0unitsof old debt must
be one: v 'kD—z j = 1,which is just equation (11).
The price of a unit of the remaining debt, 1/O(z),isgraphed in figure 2. Before the buyback
is announced, the price is as in proposition 1, 1/0(0) =1/9(0).The price of the remaining debt
rises with the size of the bu> tck for two reasons. First, as debt is bought back, the quality of the
remaining obligations improves. Second, as the country gains surplus in the better states of nature,
it invests more, further improving the quality of the remaining debt. The concavity (or convexity)
of the curve is determined by the interaction of these two factors. The frequency distribution, gfr),
determines how much more likely complete repayment becomes for a marginal increase in 6. When
g(c) is increasing, the price curve tends to be convex. On the other hand, the country's investment
response, f'4jj,isdecreasing (due to the concavity of 1)whichtends to make the price curve
concave, If c is uniformly distributed and fisconcave, then the path of the price will resemble the
concave curve shown in figure 2.12Finally,when the buyback is large enough to retire completely
the outstanding debt, lim..D eb(x)= 1,provided the last unit of debt is riskless: the entire debt
can be repurchased only at its full face value.'3
Finally, part (iii) shows that the amount of effective relief increases with the size of the buyback,
even though the rate at which old debt is exchanged, gb, falls. An increase in the size of the buyback,
6, therefore raises the welfare of both the debtor and its creditors.
2.3. Buybacks out of future cash flows, or exit bonds
Next we consider the case in which old debt is repurchased by issuing senior claims to future
cash flows. We call these claims exit bonds. If these bonds are to be senior to the existing debt,
every creditor must agree to honor their seniority before the auction takes place.14For the moment
we assume the seniority of these bonds, but we return to whether creditors would in fact grant it.
We do not require, however, that the exit bonds are riskless.
In period zero, the country announces the face amount of exit bonds it plans to issue, given
'2SeeDooley (1988), who diacuu in detail the impact of alternativefrequency distributions onbuyback pncing.
'3Thi.willbe the case a. long a. output is po.itive in all states, 1(1') +.> 0.
"New securities can be treated a. senior only if the sharing clause, mentioned in footnote 10, is waived. It the .haring clause
is not waived, any creditor is entitled to sue for its share of payments made by the country. Thu. a single 'holdout' creditor
undcmine. the assurance of othe creditor, that they will be able to keep their exit.bond repayments.
9by k, and asks creditors to make the bonds senior. As in the previous section, we assume that the
debtor and its creditors rationally anticipate the optimal period-one investment response, f =I'(r),
and that the auction is competitive. The period-one auction retires 9*/c in face value of the old
debt. The amount of effective debt relief —thereduction in the total face value of old debt less the
value of the exit bonds —isthen z =r(k)=(91(k)
—
1)/c.For the same face value, exit bonds
are strictly preferred to old debt because they are senior. Thus 0(k) > 1, and exit bonds generate
effective relief, z(k) >0,V/c > 0.
The exit-bond equilibrium is summarized in the following proposition, with proofs in the second
appendix:
ProposItion 3. When resources for a competitive buyback come from future cash flows, the
equilibrium must satisfy:
(i) Debtor welfare is the same as under pure debt relief:
Wt(x) =W'(z),Vx. (12)
(ii) Creditors' collective welfare is the same as under pure debt relief:
V"(z)=V'(z) ,Vz. (13)
(iii) If the buyback is small enough to be riskiess —thatis, if 1(P)+>k —thenthe buyback
price,gk,isequal to the price under pure debt relief:
9*(x)=o*(z) Vx. (14)
The greater the exit bond offering, the greater the level of effective relief,>0.
(iv) If the buyback is not SkIess, then the equilibrium price solves:
0(k) =(
D—9*/c (E(nun(f(r) + ck))\ (15) \E(rnin(f(P) + c, D —91/c))/' k 1'
where 0(k) < E(z(k)), V/c.
Note that in parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition debtor and creditor welfare can be written
exclusively as functions of z —regardlessof the size of the exit bond offering. By distinguishing
10between senior and subordinate claims, the auction generates effective debt relief, with no other
effects on the debtor or its creditors. Thus, for any given amount of effective relief, an issue of exit
bondsis equivalentto pure debt relief.15
Part (iii) of the proposition —whichapplies to rislcless exit bonds —showsthat the price at
which the old debt is retired, 1/91, is purely a function of the level of effective relief. Indeed, the
price is exactly equal to thece that would prevail after an equivalent amount of pure debt relief
is granted. The price of bond issues that are large enough to be risky cannot be written simply as
a function as the level of effective relief, as in part (iv). Once the bond issue is risky, the relative
riskiness of the original debt improves, so that the price must rise above what it would have been if
the bonds were riskless (s(r'(k))) The price is drawn if figure 2. The and curves separate
at the point when the bond offering becomes risky.
It is worth dwelling for a moment on how the swap rate, 9t(k)evolves,Consider the impact
on the value of creditors' claims of an increase in the size of the bond offering. Using (7) and (13):
dO1 —D d1 dx
=()@'_G)f'H)-G). (16)
Supposefora moment that investment is fixed, q=o, so that the first term in (16) is
zero. Then larger exit bond offerings lowertotalexpected payments. How is it that a strictly
positive exit bond offering reduces expected payments without any change in the total resources
available for debt service? Because creditors are competitive, the seniority of the exit bonds creates
an externality: as some creditors swap in their old debt for senior exit bonds, they degradethe
value of the old debt remaining. At the price of the first increment of the buyback, jrjj =
each creditor would strictly prefer to swap in his old debt rather than to hold on: conditional on
no other creditors swapping, each creditor is indifferent between swapping and not swapping,and
conditional on other creditors swapping, each creditor is strictly better off by swapping in old debt-
The resulting excess supply of old debt drives up the price of the exit bond in terms of old debt
(9* rises).
Now if we allow investment to respond to the amount of effective relief, the first term in
(16) becomes positive. The excess supply of old debt at 01(0) is smaller.When the country is
"Krugman(1958) di.cuua thu equivaience and pre.e.t. resultsforsmall buyback..
iion thewrongside of the Laffer curve,theinvestment response is strong enough to overcome the
subordinationeffect, andgkactually fallswithk.
2.3.1.Exit bond equilibria
Whileit is clear from proposition 3 that exit bonds and pure debt relief have many similarities,
it is their differences that explain exit bonds' popularity. First, there are differences between the
free-rider and seniority problems. Consider an individual creditor's decision about whether to
grant seniority when a country is at a point like 0 in figure 3. Suppose that the country announces
a small issue of exit bonds, and that other creditors agree to treat the bonds as senior. If the
individual creditor refuses to grant seniority, then the exit bonds are perfect substitutes for the old
debt. In that case, the equilibrium is $= 1and z= 0:no relief is generated, and the individual
creditor's claims do not change in value, If, on the other hand, this individual creditor agrees to the
subordination of old debt, the value of its claims rise marginally as the country moves up the Laffer
curve. Since an individual creditor faces no penalty in granting seniority when others do not, each
creditor will find that granting seniority is a dominant strategy when the country is on the wrong
side of the Lafter curve. (When the country is on the right side of the Laffer curve —pointA in
figure 3 —theargument runs in reverse; refusing seniority becomes the dominant strategy.) Because
individual creditors are not "small" with respect to seniority, exit bonds break the free-rider barrier
to debt relief.
A second difference between pure debt relief and an exit bond offering is the amount of effective
relief generated in equilibrium. Consider again a country at point 0 in figure 3. If creditors were
to coordinate and write down their claims, then they would choose r so that Jj'= 0,moving to
point L —thetop of the Laffer curve. Under exit bonds, however, it is the country that chooses
the amount of effective relief. Naturally, the country would like to set r as high as possible, and
will choose k accordingly.'6 But if the country announces an offering so large as to lower the value
of creditors' claims, moving, say, from point L to tin figure 3, individual creditors will not grant
seniority, and the exit bond offering will generate no effective relief. The country will therefore
respect the individual creditor's rationality constraint, setting itsuchthat Vk(z(k))￿ V(O).At a
point like 0, the country wiU optimally choose x such that Vk(x0) =Vk(O)
—acrossthe Laffer curve
SeTh. upper bound onthe amount of effective reIjd acountrycan obtain by offering riAln.exit bond,I. givenby thepoint
*thicbtlloftbeoldd.btj.retjyal. s,(91 —i)k_._. .ndL., i.uthth.e*k...a=D
12at point A. Assuming the exit bond offering is small enough to be risIcles8, equation (14) implies
that the price of the remaining debt will be given by jrfy== 5, thepre-existing price
of a unit of old debt. The face value of the optimal offering follows directly: k' = — 1).
Thus in equilibrium exit bonds can generate more effective relief than pure debt relief
It would appear that an exit bond equilibrium provides at least as much effective relief as
pure debt relief, and sometimes strictly more. Do exit bonds dominate pure debt relief from the
country's point of view? In general the answer is no. While the exit bond equilibrium yields greater
effective relief than a pure debt relief equilibrium in the neighborhood to the left of point L, the
neighborhood may be small. A country that starts out at point R will not be able to generate
enough relief to reach point D using exit bonds. There are two important criteria that determine
how far along the Laffer curve a country can move.
The first criterion is that the exit bond issue can, at most, retire the entire outstanding debt.'1
The precise level of k that exhausts the old debt has no closed form solution, and is a complex
function of the frequency distribution g(c), the probability distribution f g(c)dc and the production
function 1(1'). But the important point is that the further to the left of the Laffer-curve peak
the country starts out, the more likely it is to run out of old debt before reaching the other side.
Indeed, the country may run out of old debt before reaching the top.18
The second criterion that determines how far along the Laffer curve an exit bond issue can
move a country is the behavior of the auction price, j4g-. The marginal utility to the debtor of an
increase in the exit bond offering is Weknow from proposition 1(i) that welfare is always
increasing in the level of effective relief, ¶> 0.As proposition 3 (iii) shows, when the bond
offering is small enough to be riskless, the level of effective relief is monotonically increasing in
the size of the bond offering,>0.Small exit bond issues therefore always improve country
welfare. However, this need not be true if the exit bond issue is large enough to be risky. A
bigger, risky exit bond issue may drive gkdownso rapidly that the level of effective relief falls, i.e.
=— 1+ c 0. Thus, even when there is plenty of old debt outstanding, more exit bonds
may not generate more effective relief.'9
'7Seefootnote 16 above.
"Note that in figure 2, the 1/8k curys stop. when ll of the otd debt it retired, before reaching z = D.
"A loose intuition for this result is a, fottows. When the exit bond. are risky, • me.rginal increase in the offenng may inCre5e
the riskines, of the exit bond. substantially, without ch.ning much the riskines, of the old debt. (In terms of the model, this
depends on the density function evaluated at the point where there is just enough output to service the outstanding exit bonds,
132.4. Buybacks out of the country's endowment
Propositions 1 through 3 have stressed the similarities between buybacks and pure debt relief.
The schemes we have considered —puredebt relief, buybacks out of aid, and exit bonds —areall
ways of releasing resources to the country in the second period. Their common feature is that the
relief funds become available in the same period in which they are used. In this section we turn
to a different source of funds for buybacks: the country's current resources. We will see that these
buybacks have intertemporal implications, which are the reason they fail to be equivalent to pure
debt relief.
We now assume that the country must finance the debt repurchase using its period-one en-
dowment, 11 This pertains to a country that purchases the debt with reserves (savings), or raises
taxes on current consumption. Of course, in a maximizing model, such a distinction is irrelevant.
Regardless of where it comes from initially, a reduction in period-one resources will be spread
optimally across consumption, saving, and investment.20
In period zero the country announces its buyback, e,outof the initial endowment, E. Let the
buyback price be given by 9' and effective relief by r =z(e) = Oe.Once the resources for the
buyback are fixed at e, the country's investment problem is given by
max Ui(E—e—I)+BE(max(o,y—D+x)), (17)
with the first-order condition again given by equation (4). Inspection of (17) and (4) shows that
the optimal level of investment is no longer completely summarized by the level of effective relief.
We now denote optimal investment by 1" =r(x(e),e). Thefollowing proposition is proven in
the second appendix:
Propoeltlon 4. For any given level of effective relief, x, the investment incentives associated
with a buyback out of current resources are smaller than under pure debt relief:
f(o,o)=J(o), (18)
(c'),where'= k—1(P).)The relniveriskiness ofthe old debt would then improverapidly, sothat 0 would fall sharply.
Bigg.rbuyb.ckswouldthen lower the amouS of effective retid. it theperiod-oneconsumpUon d.cisjon is made bekr. reserves a,. used br the buybsck, then the boybask will have no
effect on period-on. consurnpdon.Butthis timing would .1. imply thatthe buybsckcannot have an effect on investment
either.
14I"(x(e),e) c I'(z), Vz,e >0, (19)
8T'(z, e)<0, Vs. (20)
The intuition for proposition 4 is straightforward. A buyback out of current resources must
lower the available endowment (by e) in order to generate a positive amount of effective relief.
When E —efalls, the marginal utility of period-one consumption must rise. The marginal return
on investment then rises above what it otherwise would have been. Investmentis therefore lower
than if the buyback resources came from elsewhere. Indeed, these intertemporai considerations can
dominate the investment-incentive effects, so that investment fallswithan increase in the size of
the buyback.2'
Thebuyback is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. For a given level of effective relief, a buyback out of the period-one endowment
implies:
(I) Debtor welfare is lower than under pure debt relief:
W(x,e)=U1(E —e—I"(r,e))+ U2(I°(x,e),r) < W(r), Vs >0, (21)
where cO.
(ii)Creditors' collective welfare is lower than under an equivalent buyback out of aid:
Vt(ri(e),e) = E(min(f(1(ri(c)1e)) + E, D —zi(efl)+ e < V6(z2(b), 6), ¼ =b, (22)
where c 0.
(iii) The rate at which old debt is exchanged, ge,isgreater than the corresponding rate for a




21The resutts in propoeition4an lairty generaL Even thoughitis doubtful that a coUntry would ftnance the entire buyback
out of period-one resource., the propositionhotd. a.long as aportion ofthe buyback resource. come. from the period-one
endowment and the remainde come, from one of the source. di.cuned in section. 2.1 throu&i 2.5. Investmentfall, a. the site
of the buyback men.... if the subutitity, U1,issufficiently concave. For email buybacki (ie., = 0) the condition for this is:
a
which can be thought of as a condition on the coefficient of eb.olute risk avernon.
15The equivalenceinpropositions I through 3 between pure debt relief, buybacks out of aid,
and buybaclcsout of futurecash flows does not carry over to buybadcs out of current resources.
A smaller investment responseto a givenamountof effectiverelief is responsible for the failure
of equivalence. Ceterisparibus,lower investment implies a lower price of the remaining old debt,
(1/r). Because investment may actually fall with e,thereis no guarantee the price will still be
increasing in the amount of the buyback. Figure 2 includes j/9talongsidethe prices discussed
earlier. Larger buybacks may lower the value of the old debt left outstanding. Even in the presence
of potent investment-incentive constraints, the "Laffer curve" for a buyback out of current resources
may be flat, or may actually be declining everywhere.22
From the debtor's point of view, buyba.cks out of current resources are dominated by buybacks
either out of ai•. nr out of future cash flows. In fact, we cannot even be sure that debtor welfare
rises with e. These buybacks provide effective debt relief, but they may come at too high a cost:
the country's optimal buyback may be zero!3 In sum, both creditors and debtors may be worse
off under a buyback out of current resources, even if the country is initially on the wrong side of
the debt-relief Laffer curve.
2.5. AssessIng buybacks vs. pure debt relief
Our analysis indicates that market-based schemes and pure debt relief are similar in many
respects, but may lead to very different outcomes. These differences are not only a result of the
mechanics of each scheme, but also of the conditions needed to make the scheme workable.
Clearly, the free-rider problem wilt be a substantial barrier to pure debt relief, even when the
country is on the wrong side of the debt-relief Laffer curve. The three buyback proposals we looked
at could be an alternative when creditors fail to coordinate. Nevertheless, each of these proposals
may be practically unworkable. Buybacks out of aid will make both creditors and debtors better
off, but at the expense of the donor. This makes large scale buybacks for the major debtors a
remote possibility.24 While none of the buyback proposals is subject to the free-rider problem, all
"Thisrequires & condion .tronger thai, that ginn ii. lootnot. 21. lntuitinly, periocl.one subutility mud be even more
conc.: investment must not only 1.11 with e, it must fall rapidly enough for the value of the remaining debt to decline. See
the secoid appendix for technical detail..
The condifion for a email buyback out of current resource to tower country welfare is given by U>øGr(o).whichfrom
the flr.t-order condition (4) is equivalent to f' > r(o). If f satisfies the mad, conditions, then the above condition will be
met for sufficiently lowE. Even if investment laura, the debt wifi han value.., claim to the random variablee. Tin, while
iun1=0f'=00, the pric. remains bounded, U,n,01(O) = M < .
3Not, from figure 1 that creditor, do best under a buyck out of aid. Bulow and Rogoff (1988) point out that as long as
there is. chance of cud. a buyout, crtdita, have an incentive to block oth types of debt.r.ducticn scheme..
16nevertheless require a measure of coordination among creditors. A wavier of the sharing clause and
mandatoryprepayment clause would have to be designed and then agreed to unanimously. This
.would necessitate negotiation among creditors and the input of legal resources. Since there are so
many syndicates with banks from all over the world participating, it is not clear who would enforce
the waiver, or how it could be made enforceable at all.
Assuming buybacks CoL.1be made workable, market-based schemes may be best for some
countries, even in the absence of a large donor. We saw that a successful exit bond offering could
conceivably take a country beyond the top of its debt-relief Laffer curve, where it is better off than
under pure debt relief. Under other circumstances, however, exit bonds would not allow the country
to reach the top. The informational requirements in determining the optimal size of a bond offering
and how far along the Laffer curve it would take the country are formidable. As Krugman (1988)
has stressed, the investment incentive effects that are responsible for the Laffer curve's upward slope
are inherently bard to measure. Essentially, creditors' entire subjective probability distribution of
future output, and the responsiveness of future output to relief would have to be known.
In practice, the chance is small that market-based schemes would be superior from the countries
point of view. Almost inevitably, an exit bond offering would use some current reserves as collateral
—asin the recent Mexican case. Then the results of section 2.4 apply, so that the buyback may hurt
the debtor. It is important to note that reserves should be thought of as current, and not future
resources, even if they are unavailable for current consumption. (In other words, a buyback out of
reserves is not equivalent to a buyback out of future cash flows.) When a credit-constrained country
holds reserves, the shadow return on foreign exchange is likely to be higher than the marginal return
on physical investment. Given that an increase in effective debt relief implies a lower probability
that the reserves will be needed for future debt service, a marginal increase in debt relief does not
generate more investment, it merely increases desired holdings of reserves. Buybacks out of reserves
will have smaller incentive effects on investment, just as buybacks out of other current resources.25
31Thispointcaneasily be made in the model above. Consider a case in whici the endowment is large enough to allow
positivereserve tobe held at the world interest rate. Then the choice of reserves and investment is given jointly by equsilon
(4) and the first-order condition that reserves earn the world rate of interest:
Aslong as reserve are strictly positive, then the &nt-order conditions together imply f'=1. The optimal level of investment
is constant and, therefore, debt relid has no impact on invetment.
173. Iiicentive venus liquidity efl'ectB on Investment
We have discussed two problems with relying on debt relief to increase investment and growth
in problem debtors. First, relief cannot be Pareto improving unless the country is on the wrong
side of the debt-relief Laffer curve. Second, if current resources are sacrificed for forgiveness, Pareto
improvements may not be possible regardless of where on the Laffer curve the country is.
Butitis also clear that future incentives are not the only factor determining investment. In
section 2.4, the usual investment response to debt relief is distorted by the use of current resources.
Countries may be liquidity constrained in addition to being incentive constrained. This suggests
that if creditors maximize the value of their claims, future payments will not be adjusted in isolation.
Instead, there will be an optimal adjustment in both the level of debt and of current liquidity.
It is not new to argue that creditors have an interest in providing sufficient liquidity to problem
debtors. Sachs (1984) and Krugman (1985)studythe role of liquidity in averting default. If an
indebted country is prepared to declare default, it makes sense to lend at a loss today in order to
retain the chance of collecting the entire debt tomorrow. The incentive-constraint argument for
promoting sufficient liquidity is, however, different: by taking advantage of high-return projects that
otherwise would have been foregone, additional lending stimulates investment and allows countries
to pay more in the future. In this case, there is no choice between either financing or forgiving;
there is an optimal combination of the two.
3.1. OptImal liquidity and debt relief
In this section we study a simple optimal liquidity-and-debt contract from creditors' point of
view. We then compare the results of this optimal contract with creditors welfare under pure debt
relief.
We employ a variant of the model in section 2, with only two changes. First, we leave out the
uncertainty in production since it is no longer essential. Output is simply p =f(1).Second, the
creditors will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer which consists of a period-two repayment, D, and an
injection of liquidity, L, in period one. The initial contractual debt is given by D0 ￿D.In this
simple framework, the country must first decide whether to invest. If it invests, the optimal level
18of investment, I' = r(L), is given by the first-order condition:
=U(E+L— F)
(24)
where, as before, we assume that the country is credit constrained, 7>1. By the implicit function




Notice that creditors have no control over how the country divides the new liquidity between
investment and consumption, 11 "conditionality" were applied, forcing the country to invest a
large-than-desired share of L, then the argument for liquidity relief would be even stronger.
The fact that (25) is positive implies that the most severely liquidity-constrained debtors will
have the lowest chosen levels of investment. Debt relief increases investment from 0 to
liquidity-constrained countries will therefore gain less from pure debt relief than countries with
more liquidity.
The country will invest only if it gains from doing so- Its rationality constraint requires that
welfare with investment is greater than welfare with no investment:
U1(E+L—r)+$(f(fl—D) >U1(E+L), (26)
where we again assume that the period-two repayment is min(y, D). Equation (26) implies that
for any given amount of liquidity, creditors will maximize the value of their claims by lowering the
debt payment to:
D(L) =U1(E+L—I')—U1(E+L)+1(1'). (27)
Equation (27) says that if creditors write down the debt, they will do so to be at the top of the
debt-relief Laffer curve. Given L, lower values of D imply a one-for-one reduction in expected
payments, while higher values imply expected payments fall to zero. The function D(L) defines a
family of debt-relief Laffer curves, one for each L.
It is easy to show that the debt payment is an increasing function of liquidity, D'(L) >
0.26Greaterliquidity raises the optimal level of investment and, therefore, increases the payment
"The envelope thea'em implie, thatdD(I'(L),L)=ancr.&l = U(stL_I)—U(E+L)>0, becaun m.gin,I utility ii
highwhen Inweetnent crowd, outcurrentcon.umpdon
19creditors can extract. It follows that countries that are more liquidity constrained are more likely
to be on the wrong sideofthe debt-relief Laffer curve. Figure 3 demonstrates, showing three Laffer
curves with different underlying levels of liquidity, L3 > L1 > L0. As the country is more illiquid,
the Laffer curve shifts down (since from (25),>0), and the peak shifts toward the left (since
LV > 0)? Suppose the debt is initially at D0. Then it is clear that if the country has liquidity
equal to L2, pure debt relief will not be in creditors' interest. On the other hand, if the country
is severely liquidity constrained, at £ =L,then there is scope for pure debt relief. The irony
is that countries with weak investment-incentive effects are also the most likely recipient.s of pure
debt relief.
Fortunately for all, creditors may gain by adjusting the level of liquidity. They will not,
however, choose the L that gives the highest Laffer curve. They will instead set the pair {D, L}
to maximize the discounted value of cash flows, D —L.Since creditors can collectively choose to
set L =0and still receive a period-two repayment (by setting D =D(0)),any new lending must
be profitable in itself. Notice, however, that as long as the initial debt, D0, is high enough, the
free-rider problem remains: an individual creditor would prefer not to write down his portion of
the debt in the first place, even when others do.28 We then have the following proposition, proven
in the second appendix:
Proposition 6. The optimal contract, {D,L'}, solves:29
f'V)= 1+U(E; L) (28)
D'(L) =U1(E+C —I')—Uj(E+C)+ 1(r) (29) p
whereP is given by equation (24).
The intuition for this contract can be seen in figure 4. Suppose the country has an initial
Not,that the horizontal axis in figure IS V.
Some debt relief, required before profitable Lending can be undctaken. If debt rel,Mwerenot needed, then there would
be no fre, rider problem; individual creditors would find it in their interest to lend, regardless of th. behavior of others.
We auum, that the country is sutciently liquidity constrained to satisfy the ,econd-ord condition for thi, problem,
<0.
TItlecondition hoIth, for example, for isoelastic utility and production functions at sufficiently low levets of the endowment, E.
20obligation D0 and liquidity L0 =0.The expected value of the debt payment is shown by point A.
Pure debt relief (or one of the buyback scenarios discussed in section 2) can move the country to
thetopof the L0 Laffer curve, point B. The improvement in incentives raises debtor welfare and
investment andreducescurrent consumption. But since marginal utility rises (see equation (4)),
the return on investment will not fall as much as the improved incentives merit. The country will
therefore be unwilling to undertake all of the investment projects that become profitable at world
interest rates. For the liquidity constrained country, we would have such a high marginal return
on investment that f(J*) > 1 + U'(E + Lo).° Creditors can capture a surplus above the world
interest rate on additional investment by providing liquidity while reducing (by more) the amount
of debt relief. This shifts the value of the claims from point B to C. Note that creditors would be
strictly worse oil if debt relief and new lending were negotiated separately, because then the new
lending would be competitive. Creditors obtain the surplus by offering to provide simultaneously
new lending and debt relief. Provided the second-order conditions above hold we have:
Proposition 7. The more liquidity-constrained the country is, the more creditors sacrifice
with simple debt-reduction schemes in comparison with the optimal liquidity and debt relief given
in proposition 6.





whichwili be satisfied for low cnou#l E and, for example, i.oeh.tic production sad utility function..
214. ConclusIons
Our four main conclusions canbe statedas follows:
1) Market-based debtreliefschemes are similar to pure debt relief in the sense that they reduce
the debt overhang. These plans can therefore be Pareto improving only if investment-incentive
effects are sufficiently important.
2) Market-based plans differ from pure debt relief, and from one another, according tothe
source of resources used to retire old debt. In particular, debtors that finance buybackswith
current resources can substantially worsen the investment-incentive effects on which these plans
critically rely.
3) If investment-incentive effects are important enough to make debt reduction profitable for
creditors, then debt reduction alone wilt not generally be optimal from the creditor's perspective.
Thus neither market-based schemes nor pure debt relief will generally maximize the value of creditor
claims.
4) In general, countries that are liquidity-constrained are the best candidates for an optimal
relief package which includes new lending as well as partial debt forgiveness-
These conclusions are relatively general, and are likely to come out of more realistic, and more
omplicated models of the investment process. We have abstracted from such issues as capital
flight, the debtor's internal financing constraints, and how creditors impose penalties in instances
of default- Nevertheless, we believe that our general conclusions will remain when these issues are
considered explicitly. We have also ignored the moral hazard and adverse selection problems which
naturally arise once debt relief is on the table (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1988) study these
problems).
Finally, our analysis takes as given the presence of investment-incentive effects. For these
effects to give the L,affer curve its bowed shape, there must be sufficiently many marginal investment
projects with sufficiently high returns. We have assumed the existence of these effects because in
their absence there is no scope for Pareto improvements under any debt-reduction plan (given risk
neutrality). We have therefore given the benefit of the doubt to the advocates of one or more of
22these schemes. Nevertheless, there is thus far no empirical evidence that suggests incentive effects
are important, or present at all.
235. AppendIx 1: A primer on buybacks and exit bonds
In this appendix, we present simple examples to show how market-based debt-reduction
schemes work.
By "buyback" we mean a cash repurchase of existing debt on a competitive secondarymarket.
The resources for the repurchase may come Irom a variety of sources: exogenous aid from outside
the country, the country's current resources, or its future cash flows. An "exit bond" is actually a
buyback using resources from future cash flows. Exit bonds can be used for debtrelief if they are
treated as senior claims to the future cash flows.
In our simple examples we assume that cash flows are fixed and out of the country's control.
(In the text we add the incentive effects which are crucial to the togic of these plans.)Consider a
two-period economy with two equiprobable states in period two, and corresponding cashflows of
1 and 2 dollars. We denote the cash flow by .Alsoin period two, the country's inherited debt of
D =2dollars comes due. To keep things simple, we let the interest rate be zero, and we assume
that first-period consumption is positive.
if creditors are to induce the country to service its debt, they must have access to some credible
punishment mechanism. We make the "gunboat-technology" assumption that the creditors can
seize the entire output if the country cannot pay in full. Thus repayments will be given by
R min(Q,2) = (Al)
The expected payment is therefore E() =1.5.
Now suppose that in period one an outside source agrees to donate funds to be used in buying
back some of the outstanding debt. Table 1 shows the cash flows associated with a buyback of 1
dollar. Let phbethe dollar amount of original debt retired in the buyback. Then the country will
have a second-period liability of 2 —94dollars. The payments on the remaining original debt are
now given by min(2 —p6
How much original debt will be retired? If the buyback is competitive and preannounced (so
that the resources available for the buyback are known by the creditors), then phmustbe such
that individual creditors are indifferent between holding onto their old debt and trading in their
old debt for cash. Then with risk neutral creditors, in equilibrium 9 units of the old debt must
24yield one dollar in expectation:
(
E(min(2-;•.9))) — (A2)
Equation (A2) is highly nonlinear, but in this caseitis easy to verify chat ?= 1is the equilibrium.
Notice that just enough of the old debt is retired to make the remaining amount, 2_9b* =1,riskless.
Anytime the buyback is big enough to make the remaining old debt pay its face value with certainty,
the last increment of old debt retired must be exchanged one-for-one for cash, t= 1.
Expected creditor receipts are now I + E(min(2 —gb., )) = 2,higher than the expected
payment of 1.5 before the buyback. The intuition is that the buyback makes new resources —a
dollar's worth of debtor consumption —availablefor debt service. The creditors now get the full
face value of their original claims. The debtor is also better off. It must pay only 1 dollar in each
state, keeping the second dollar in state 2. In this example, there is no particular reason that the
buyback resources must come from outside the country (as they did in the Bolivian buyback). As
long as the resources are fully additional —previouslyunavailable for debt service —totalcreditor
receipts are the same. The country could, for example, reduce period 1 consumption in order to
obtain the buyback resources. It would lose a dollar's worth of first-period consumption, and gain
an equivalent amount of consumption in state 2. As long as the country prefers a certain dollar
today to a less-than-certain dollar tomorrow, it is worse off by going ahead with the buyback.
To see why the source of the resources used in the buyback is critical, consider a variation on
our example. Suppose that I dollar of the future cash flow is already available in period one. We
can think of this 1 dollar as resources that are earmarked for current savings, such as a debtor's
central bank reserves. All that is important is that the debtor will not consume these resources
in period one, and that they are available for consumption or debt service —orconfiscation in the
case of default —inperiod 2. if the debtor auctions off these resources in return for some old debt,
we refer to it as a buyback out of saving.
Notice that the buyback out of saving is hnanced directly out of tbe period-two cash flow. By
assumption, there is no effect on current consumption, and no no new resources become available
for debt service. Thble 2 shows the payments. The country, must service in period two the 1 dollar
exit bond obligation as well as 2 —gk ofremaining old debt. Payments on the old debt are now
min(2 — — 1).
25The equilibrium price of the buy back is determined competitively, as in (A2):
—gk.,u—1))) = 1. (A3)
2—gk.
Itis easy to veri&thatO =2solves equation (A3). The last increment of old debt exchanged
pays zero in state 1 and its face value in state 2, an expected return of l/9 =.5.Notice that
a 1 dollar buyback out of saving retires the entire stock of old debt. Thus the country's expected
payments are 1 -f- E(min(2 —9k,Q
—1))=1,less than the original expected value of the debt. The
country clearly benefits at the expense of the creditors: through the buyback the country is entitled
to 1 additional dollar of period-two consumption in state 2, without any reduction in period-one
consumption.
How is it that a buyback out of saving reduces the expected payments to the creditors, without
any change in the resources available for debt service? Such a buyback allows the country to take
advantage of the lack of coordination among creditors. Each creditor is concerned only with the
marginal value of the old debt. Thus an externality arises: as some creditors swap in their old debt
for cash, they degrade the value of the old debt remaining. At the price of the first increment of
buyback, 8o =2/E(Q) = 1.33,each creditor would strictly prefer to swap in his old debt than o
hold on: conditional on no other creditors swapping, each creditor is indifferent between swapping
and not swapping, and conditional on other creditors swapping, each creditor is strictly better off
by swapping in old debt. The resulting excess supply of old debt drives up the price of the cash in
ins of old debt from 1.33 to 2.
Finally, we consider an issue of exit bonds which is treated by both creditors and the debtor
as senior to the old debt. Here an exit bond is exactly equivalent to a buyback out of saving:
holders of old debt now own claims to the same, residual future cash flows. (In the text, where
investment incentives are included in the analysis, this equivalence breaks down.) Thus either type
of swap leads to the equilibrium given by equation (A3). The country benefits at the expense of
the creditors as the expected value of payments falls from 1.5 to 1.
Our examples therefore demonstrate that when the new security is not backed by additional
funds, creditors lose from a market-based debt relief plan.
266. AppendIx 2: Proofs of the propositions In the text
Proof of proposition 2. (i) Recall that effective relief is equal to the amount of old debt
retired in the buyback,x=ebb.The debtor welfare is given by:








Thusdebtor welfare increases with the amount of effective relief.
Nextweshow thatthe amount ofeffective relief increases with the size of the buyback, 4J>0
dx debdx—________
+7b_ 1—b(dø/dx)
Fromproposition I (ii) and proposition 2 (iii):
dx
Since for all x, 0= E(Ün(D—￿1,and -E[oo, —1) thenc 0, and it follows that
(ii). To see that creditor welfare increases in the size of the buyback, note that:
dVbdVdx
Since> 1 and C[,—1],it follows that ç>o.
Proof of proposition 3.
(i). Debtor welfare under an exit bond offering is given by:
Wk(x) =U1+ E(max(0, 1(r) +— k)+ max(0,f(1) + c —D+ 0k))
= Uj+ E(max(O,f (1') + —D+ (0— 1)k)= W'(x).
(ii). The value of creditors' claims under an exit bond offering is given by:
V1 = E(max(0,rnin(f(1) + c —K,V —Ok))+ k) = E(rnin(f(1) + e, D —x))=




+ e,D — —E(rnin(f(I')+ c,k))
D—9k I k
where the right-hand side is the expected return on a one-dollar exit bond, If the exit bond is
riskiess, then this expected return is one, and proposition 3 (iii) follows after a little algebra.
Proof of proposItion 4. Follows from the debtor's first-order condition, and application of
the implicit function theorem.
Proof of proposition 5. Follows directly from proposition 4.
Proof of proposItion 6. The creditors' collective maximizes D(L) —L.Taking the first-order
condition and using equation (24) yields (28). Equation (29) follows from (27) directty
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29TABLE 1:Baybankout of Aid
Total State
—
Cash flow 1 2
Expected payments




buyback repurchase 1 1 1
Old debt remaining 2-9 min(2-B,,l) min(2-@,2)
Inequil.
Totalpayments 2 2 2







w/pe yb a Ck
Reserves used for
buyback purchase 1 1
Remainingcashflows 0.5 0 1
k t Old debtremaining 2-6 min(2-6.O) min(2-Ol)
Inequilibrium.
Totalpayment
including buyback 1 IFigure 1
Total Value of Creditor Claims
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